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Abstract
Users of location-based services (LBSs) are highly vulnerable
to privacy risks since they need to disclose, at least partially,
their locations to benefit from these services. One possibil-
ity to limit these risks is to obfuscate the location of a user
by adding random noise drawn from a noise function. In this
paper, we require the noise functions to satisfy a generic loca-
tion privacy notion called `-privacy, which makes the position
of the user in a given region X relatively indistinguishable
from other points in X. We also aim at minimizing the loss
in the service utility due to such obfuscation. While existing
optimization frameworks regard the region X restrictively as
a finite set of points, we consider the more realistic case in
which the region is rather continuous with a non-zero area.
In this situation, we demonstrate that circular noise functions
are enough to satisfy `-privacy on X and equivalently on the
entire space without any penalty in the utility. Afterwards, we
describe a large parametric space of noise functions that sat-
isfy `-privacy on X, and show that this space has always an
optimal member, regardless of ` and X. We also investigate
the recent notion of -geo-indistinguishability as an instance
of `-privacy, and prove in this case that with respect to any
increasing loss function, the planar Laplace noise function is
optimal for any region having a nonzero area.
1 Introduction
The popularity of hand-held devices, such as smartphones,
that have positioning capabilities has lead to the development
of Location-Based services (LBSs). In an LBS, the device of a
user sends a request together with his geographical position to
the service provider who personalizes the service according to
the reported location. The usefulness of these LBSs comes at
the cost of various privacy risks as discussed by [22, 18, 12].
For example, based on the disclosed locations of the user, an
adversary can identify the points of interests of a user, such as
the home and workplace, predict his mobility and even recon-
struct part of his social network.
∗The final publication (in the International Journal of Informa-
tion Security) is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/
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To limit these risks, one possibility for achieving location
privacy is to make the position of a user indistinguishable to
some degree from other locations. A recent trend of research
[27, 26, 1, 11] has been directed to obfuscating the user’s lo-
cation in the submitted queries and has lead to several quan-
tifications of location privacy. For instance, the authors of
[27, 26] have developed a framework in which the location
privacy of the user is measured by the expected adversary’s
error in estimating the user’s real location. However, this
quantification depends on the user’s prior distribution (i.e., his
probabilities to be in the individual points of the considered
space) and also on the strong assumption that the adversary
knows this prior.
Since it is hard to control or even to assess the knowledge
of the adversary, another work [1] has introduced the notion
of -geo-indistinguishability, which abstracts away from both
the knowledge of the adversary and the prior of the user.
This notion describes the required protection as a guarantee
on the obfuscation mechanism itself. Informally, a mecha-
nism K should not report an output that influences too much
the knowledge of the adversary about the user’s real location.
More precisely, a mechanism K satisfies -geo-indistinguish-
ability if the log of the ratio between the probability of report-
ing an output when the user is at location i, and that proba-
bility when he is instead at location j does not exceed a dis-
tinguishability  d in which  > 0 is a fixed privacy parameter
and d is the distance between i and j. This means that the
user’s position is hardly distinguishable from nearby points,
while being increasingly (i.e., at a linear rate) distinguishable
from far away points. The notion of -geo-indistinguishability
is inspired from differential privacy, which was proposed in
[8] to protect the privacy of the participants in statistical
databases. In principle, the addition or removal of a partici-
pant in the database should have a minor impact on the output
of algorithm operating on the database. In that sense, -geo-
indistinguishability, similarly to differential privacy, abstracts
from the adversary’s knowledge, and restricts the information
disclosed through the mechanism to the observer.
The idea of restricting the distinguishability between each
pair of locations in a geographical region X is generalized
in [11] to give rise to the notion of `-privacy. Here `(.) is a
function that specifies for every distance a maximum level of
distinguishability. The function `(.) can take various forms
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depending on the user’s privacy requirements. For exam-
ple, if the distinguishability between two points is required
to increase linearly, setting `(d) =  d yields -geo-indisting-
uishability. Alternatively, if only the distinguishability be-
tween nearby points (within distance D) is required to be re-
stricted, setting `(d) = { if d ≤ D, and ∞ otherwise}, leads
to another instance called (D, )-location privacy [11].
Obfuscating the position reported to the LBS provider
causes a degradation in the quality of the obtained service
since it is tuned to the reported location instead of the real
one. This degradation is typically measured by a loss function
L(d) specifying the loss (as a non-negative number) when the
distance between the real position of the user and the reported
one is d. The utility of the mechanism for a user is therefore
measured by the expected value of the loss function, taking
into account the prior distribution of the user and the proba-
bilistic obfuscation performed by the mechanism.
In this work, our main objective is to provide a mathemat-
ically grounded framework that allows to optimize the trade-
off between the utility of the LBS requested by the user and
his location privacy within a geographical region. A previ-
ous approach that was adopted in [4] for the case of -geo-
indistinguishability is to regard the region as a finite set of
points X and to assume that the outputs of a mechanism are
also drawn fromX. In this situation, an optimal mechanism is
obtained by solving a linear optimization problem that mini-
mizes the expected loss (taking user’s prior into account) sub-
ject to the privacy constraints. Here, the main difficulty is that
the number of linear constraints is too large because of the
restriction of the distinguishability between every two points
in X, and considering also every output of the mechanism.
Despite the improvement proposed by the authors of [4] to re-
duce the number of constraints, the size of X has still to be
very small (e.g., 50 to 75 points) to solve the problem in a
reasonable time.
While it is always possible to discretize any geographical
region into a finite set of points, this discretization usually
incurs a significant loss of quality for the users. For example,
to construct a mechanism that satisfies `-privacy for the users
in Paris using the above linear optimization, we would need
to divide its map into a grid of a feasible size (e.g., 63 cells as
shown in Figure 1(a)), making every cell 1.5km × 1.5km. In
this discretization scheme, the position of every user is always
approximated by the center of the enclosing cell before being
obfuscated by the mechanism. Figure 1(b) displays one cell
in which a user located near its north-east corner asks for the
nearest restaurant to his position. In this case, he would get
an answer that is tailored, in the best case, to the center of
his cell, which is 0.812km away from him. It is clear that the
situation gets more problematic as we consider larger regions.
We take a different approach centered on mechanisms that
we call “symmetric”. In these mechanisms, a single distribu-
tion P, called the “noise distribution” is used to sample the
noise added to the user’s location to produce the reported out-
put. Since the added noise is essentially an Euclidean vector,
the distribution P is also regarded as a probability measure on
the subsets of the Euclidean vector space E2. This distribu-
tion can be described more succinctly in many situations by a
probability density function (pdf) F , which we refer to as the
“noise function” of P. This scheme is both simple and scal-
able with respect to the topology and the size of the consid-
ered region X since it is based on one probability distribution
(i.e, on the noise) that is used at every position of the user in
X. Moreover, the expected loss is independent of the user’s
prior, making the notion of an optimal noise dependent only
on the regionX and the considered loss function. In this work,
we provide a framework that investigates the above approach
in the general setting of the distinguishability (privacy) func-
tion `(.) and the region of interest X, aiming to find the opti-
mal noise function with respect to an arbitrary loss function.
More precisely, our main contributions can be summarized as
follows.
Main contributions.
• We extend symmetric mechanisms [11] by using their
noise distributions instead of their pdfs (i.e., noise func-
tions) since these latter ones may not exist in some cases
(e.g., when the distribution assigns non-zero probabili-
ties to discrete vectors). In this extension, we describe
the precise condition on a distribution P to exhibit a
noise function, and the condition on this function to sat-
isfy `-privacy. This privacy condition turns to be inde-
pendent of the continuity restriction that was imposed in
[11] on all noise functions.
• When the region X is continuous with a non-zero area,
we prove that some practical instances of `-privacy are
satisfied onX only if they are satisfied on the entire space
R2. Based on this result, the class of circular noise func-
tions turns to be general enough (i.e., without any penalty
in the utility due to restriction to this class) to satisfy `-
privacy on any region having a non-zero area. This ex-
tends the special case in which the region is a disc in R2
as shown in [11].
• For any setting of distinguishability function `, set of lo-
cations X and loss function L, we describe precise con-
ditions that allow a space of noise functions to have an
optimal member for X with respect to ` and L. Based on
these conditions, we describe a parametric space of noise
functions that always admits such an optimal member.
• We consider the instance `(d) =  d, which corresponds
to the notion of -geo-indistinguishability [1], and prove
that in this setting the planar Laplacian noise function
(a two-dimensional version of the Laplace density func-
tion) is optimal, with respect to any increasing loss func-
tion and for any region X having a non-zero area.
Outline of the paper. First in Section 2, we review the re-
lated work before introducing in Section 3 some preliminar-
ies, such as the notions of mechanisms, `-privacy and the
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Figure 1: Approach in which Paris is represented by a finite set of cells: (a) Division of the city into 63 squared cells. The
side length of every cell is 1.5km. (b) One cell in which the user is 812 meters away from the center.
utility measure. Then, in Section 4 we develop the formal
tools to analyze the privacy of noise distributions and their
corresponding noise functions. Afterwards in Section 5, we
focus on continuous regions having nonzero areas and dis-
cuss the conditions of satisfying `-privacy on them before
discussing in Section 6 the existence of optimal noise func-
tions considering an arbitrary setting of the distinguishability
function `, the region X and the loss function L. As a case
study, we describe in Section 7 the optimal noise function for
-geo-indistinguishability and finally summarize our conclu-
sions and directions for future work in Section 8.
2 Related work
A possibility to define location privacy is with respect to the
ability of an adversary to identify the user’s location [29]. One
of the first attempts to achieve location privacy in this direc-
tion was to hide the association between the user’s identity
and his location by removing his identity from the request
submitted to the LBS provider or replace it with a pseudonym
[24]. However, it turns out that the user’s identity can be
uncovered by correlating his disclosed locations with some
background knowledge [2, 21, 13]. This issue motivated re-
cent approaches focusing on obfuscating the user’s location
itself before sending it to the server. For example, the authors
of [19, 14] proposed a k-anonymization of the user location,
in the sense that the region reported to the LBS provider, is
called a “cloak”, and ensures that the user is indistinguishable
from k − 1 other users. However, as shown by [29], this guar-
antee may be sometimes inconsistent with the location privacy
of the requesting user, for instance if k users are in the same
location or at least in a small area. In addition, the protec-
tion provided by this “cloaking” technique depends heavily
on the background knowledge of the adversary. To address
this shortcoming, the authors of [27, 26] have developed an-
other metric for location privacy, which is the expected error
of the adversary’s estimation of the user’s location. The larger
this error is, the higher level of privacy is given to the user. In
this quantification, it is explicitly assumed that the adversary
knows the user’s prior.
Since it is hard in practice to assess the knowledge of ad-
versaries, specially in the existence of public sources of in-
formation [11], a recent concept that is inspired from differ-
ential privacy [8] is to quantify location privacy instead by
the amount of information leaked through the privacy mech-
anism itself. Therefore, this makes this measure independent
of both the user’s prior and the adversary’s knowledge. Dif-
ferential privacy has been used for instance by the authors of
[7] in a non-interactive setting to sanitize the transit data of the
users of Montre´al transportation system. To allow such saniti-
zation despite the inherent high-dimensionality of the consid-
ered data, the authors adopted a data-dependent approach to
restrict the output domain of the sanitization mechanism in the
light of the underlying database. In our work, we focus on in-
teractive mechanisms sanitizing the user’s location each time
he sends a request to an LBS. An adaptation of differential
privacy in this setting was proposed by the authors of [1] in
which the distinguishability between the user’s location and
another point (in a fixed domain X) increases linearly with
the distance between the two points. This makes the user’s
location indistinguishable from nearby points, while being in-
creasingly distinguishable from further away points. A gen-
eralization of this model has been proposed in [11] in which
the distinguishability, modeled by a generic function `(.), be-
tween two points still depends on the distance between them,
but may take various forms depending on the privacy require-
ments of the user. The article [11] introduced also a restricted
form of “symmetric mechanisms”, which we extend in terms
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of the underlying noise distributions.
With respect to optimizing the trade-off between privacy
and the expected loss, in addition to [4] which we already
mentioned in the introduction, the authors of [28] considered
this problem from a different perspective. They relied on
the view of location privacy as the expected adversary’s er-
ror in estimating the user’s real location (as in [27, 26] above)
and proposed to construct the mechanism that maximizes the
user’s privacy, while respecting a certain threshold on the util-
ity. They also assume that the adversary has an optimal strat-
egy that exploits his knowledge about the user’s prior to guess
the real location. This construction is performed by solving
a linear optimization problem in which the number of con-
straints is quadratic with respect to the number of locations in
the considered regionX, and therefore has the same efficiency
limitations of the methodology used in [4].
According to the distinction made by [26] between spo-
radic and continuous location exposure, we focus in this ar-
ticle on the sporadic case in which the locations reported
by the user are sparsely distributed over time such that they
can be considered independent of each other. In this case
it is sufficient to sanitize each single location in an indepen-
dent manner. However, in the continuous exposure scenario,
the successive reported locations are correlated and therefore
other approaches are required to protect the user’s entire trace.
For instance, [7] describes an efficient mechanism to sanitize
a collection of mobility traces in a non-interactive fashion,
while in the interactive setting of accessing LBSs, other tech-
niques such as the predictive mechanism [6] may be used to
mitigate the impact of the correlation between the user’s suc-
cessive locations on his privacy.
Finally, we want to point out that our notion of symmet-
ric mechanism is similar to the noise-adding mechanism of
[15] in the sense that both of them add continuous obfusca-
tion noise independently of the original data, and the two ar-
ticles aim to optimize the added noise. However, they differ
in two main aspects. First, while the mechanism in [15] adds
real-valued noise to the numerical query results, our mecha-
nisms add vector-valued noise to the the user’s real position.
Second, while [15] aims to satisfy the standard -differential
privacy for statistical databases, our goal is more general in
the sense that we want to satisfy `-privacy for the user’s loca-
tions. The same authors of [15] described also in another work
[16] a (nearly) optimal noise-adding mechanism satisfying the
approximate (, δ)-differential privacy for integer-valued and
histogram queries.
3 Preliminaries
We consider a user who may be located anywhere in a certain
domain of locations X ⊆ R2, and uses an obfuscation mech-
anism to produce a noisy position, which is reported to the
LBS server. Thus, a mechanism is modeled by a probabilistic
function K : X → R2 that takes the user’s real location i ∈ X
and reports a position p ∈ R2 to the LBS provider. We write
this probabilistic event as K(i) = p. The difference between
the reported and real locations is an Euclidean vector ~µ ∈ E2,
which we coin as the noise vector, ~µ = p− i 1. The input do-
main X of the mechanism is arbitrary and is usually specified
to capture all the points that the user may visit. The output
domain of the mechanism, on the other side, is assumed to be
the entire space R2.
3.1 `-privacy
A mechanism K satisfies `-privacy (for a user) on a domain
of locations X if it guarantees that for each region S ⊆ R2,
the probability of reporting a point in S when the user is at i,
i.e. P(K(i) ∈ S ), is not “too different” from that probability
when he is instead at j (both i, j are in X). The restriction on
this difference between the two probabilities depends on the
distance between i and j (i.e. |i − j|) and the specification of
a distinguishability function `. More formally, we recall the
definition of this notion from [11].
Definition 1 (`-privacy [11]). For a distinguishability func-
tion ` : [0,∞) → [0,∞), a mechanism K satisfies `-privacy
on X if for all S ⊆ R2 it holds
P(K(i) ∈ S ) ≤ e`(|i− j|)P(K( j) ∈ S ) ∀i, j ∈ X.
Note that the level of privacy is controlled by the behavior
of `(.) with respect to the distance d between the two points.
The distinguishability function `(d) may be also seen as mod-
eling the risk of distinguishing the user’s location from others
at distance d. For example, the risk level may get lower as the
distance d grows and is accordingly modeled by an increasing
`(d).
3.2 Symmetric mechanisms
A mechanism K is called ‘symmetric’ if sampling the noise
vector is independent of the real location of the user [11].
More precisely, a symmetric mechanism samples a noise vec-
tor ~µ using a fixed probability distribution P on the subsets
of the vector space E2 and then reports to the LBS server the
user’s location after adding ~µ to it. We call P the noise distri-
bution of K .
In [11], a symmetric mechanism was defined using the
probability density function (pdf) of the distribution P, as-
suming that this pdf exists for P. Moreover, this pdf, which
is also called a noise function, was assumed to be continuous
everywhere in each bounded subregion of E2, except possibly
on finitely many analytic curves. In our reasoning about opti-
mality, we will abstract from these assumptions and base our
analysis on the noise distribution P as a probability measure
before studying its pdf (if it exists). More precisely in Section
4, we will redefine a symmetric mechanism in a more generic
manner using its noise distribution P, demonstrate the precise
conditions onP to satisfy `-privacy, and then proceed to study
its corresponding pdf (i.e., its noise function).
1 Throughout this paper, we denote the space of points (i.e., locations) by
R2, while the space of Euclidean vectors is represented by E2.
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3.3 Loss functions and the expected loss
The utility of a mechanism for the user is measured by the
expected (average) “loss” incurred due to reporting noisy lo-
cations instead of the real ones. This requires specifying a
loss function L : [0,∞) → [0,∞) that assigns to each noise
magnitude a loss value. In general, the expected loss depends
on the prior probabilities pi of visiting the points of X, and of
course on the mechanism. However if the mechanism is sym-
metric (i.e., the noise vector is sampled using a fixed noise
distribution P as described earlier) the expected loss is inde-
pendent of X and the prior distribution pi. Assuming that P
has a probability density function (i.e., a noise function) F , it
was shown in [11] that the expected loss of F with respect to
L is given by
Ψ(F ,L) = E[L(|~µ|)] =
"
E2
F (~µ)L(|~µ|) dλ(~µ). (1)
In practice, the loss L is defined by the user depending
on the target LBS. For example, if he wants to query the
set of nearest restaurants to his position, L may be defined
as L(x) = x; i.e. the less perturbation of his location, the
more useful is the response of his query. Alternatively, for a
weather forecasting service, L(x) may take the value 0 if the
noise magnitude x is within a certain threshold in which the
weather is almost uniform, while it takes larger values beyond
this threshold.
4 Noise distributions and noise func-
tions
As mentioned previously in Section 3.2, a symmetric mech-
anism is determined by its noise distribution P, which corre-
sponds to its probability measure on the subsets of the vector
space E2. Therefore, we define a symmetric mechanism in the
following by its corresponding distribution P.
For any set of points S ⊆ R2, let vec(S ) be the set of po-
sition vectors that correspond to the points in S . In addition
for any set of vectors V ⊆ E2, and a vector ~u, let τ~u(V) be the
translation image of V by ~u. Finally, let P(V) be the proba-
bility that the sampled noise vector is a member of V . Then
we define a symmetric mechanism using its underlying noise
distribution as follows.
Definition 2 (Symmetric mechanism). A mechanism K is
said to be symmetric if there is a noise distribution P on the
subsets of the vector space E2 such that for every input loca-
tion i and a region S , it holds that
P(K(i) ∈ S ) = P(τ−i(vec(S ))).
The above definition means that an output point in S is pro-
duced by first sampling a noise vector from E2 using P, and
then adding this vector to the user’s position i. It is important
to characterize when exactly a noise distribution P satisfies `-
privacy on a set of locations X. By Definition 1 of `-privacy,
the probability of any output of the mechanism should not
substantially (subject to the function `(.)) vary from the proba-
bility of this event if the user’s position inX changes by a vec-
tor ~u. If a fixed noise distribution P is used for sampling noise
vectors independently of the input location, this statement can
be translated to an equivalent condition on the distribution P.
This condition has to take into account all displacements that
the user can make inX. Therefore, in the following we denote
by VX the set of all possible displacement vectors in X (i.e.,
VX = { j − i : i, j ∈ X}).
Theorem 1 (`-private distributions). A noise distribution P
satisfies `-privacy on the domain X if and only if
P(V) ≤ e`(|~u|)P(τ~u(V)) ∀V ⊆ E2,∀~u ∈ VX. (2)
Proof. First we show that Def. 1 implies Inequality (2) in
the theorem. Consider any V ⊆ E2, and any ~u ∈ VX. Then
there must be two points i, j ∈ X such that ~u = i − j. Let
S be a planar region such that V = τ−i(vec(S )). Therefore
τi− j(V) = τi− j(τ−i(vec(S ))) = τ− j(vec(S )). Using Def. 2 we
obtain P(V) = P(K(i) ∈ S ), and P(τi− j(V)) = P(K( j) ∈ S ).
Now using Def. 1, we get P(V) ≤ e`(|i− j|)P(τi− j(V)), which
yields Inequality (2) by substituting ~u = i − j.
Conversely, we show that Inequality (2) implies the in-
equality in Def. 1. Consider any region S , and any i, j ∈ X.
Let V = τ−i(vec(S )). As shown above, τi− j(V) = τ− j(vec(S )).
Substituting these equalities in (2) with ~u = i − j ∈ VX, we
obtain P(τ−i(vec(S ))) ≤ e`(|i− j|)P(τ− j(vec(S ))) which leads,
using Def. 2, to the inequality of Def. 1. 
4.1 Noise functions
Since the noise vectors are sampled from the vector space E2
which is clearly continuous, it makes sense to describe a noise
distributionP by a corresponding probability density function
(pdf) F : E2 → R+. We coin this pdf as the “noise function”
of P. However, in general, this function may not exist for P.
For instance, if P is a distribution on a discrete set of noise
vectors in E2, then P has no noise function. The necessary
and sufficient condition on P to have a noise function is rec-
ognized by the Radon-Nikodym theorem [25, Theorem 5.4],
which is formulated using the Lebesgue measure λ(V) of ev-
ery subset V of E2. Precisely, a distribution P has a noise
function if and only if every null subset of E2, (i.e. having
Lebesgue measure zero), has also probability 0. In formal
terms, this property means that P(V) = 0 whenever λ(V) = 0.
A distribution P that has this property is said to be “abso-
lutely continuous” with respect to λ, and is written as P  λ.
In this case, the Lebesgue differentiation theorem relates the
noise distribution P to its noise function F , and leads to the
following important characterization of `-privacy in terms of
F .
Theorem 2 (`-private noise functions). Let P be a noise dis-
tribution satisfying P  λ. Then P and its noise function F
satisfy `-privacy on a domain X if and only if there is a null
set N ⊂ E2 such that for all vectors ~v,~v′ ∈ E2 \ N , it holds
F (~v) ≤ e`(|~v−~v′ |) F (~v′) whenever ~v − ~v′ ∈ VX. (3)
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Proof. Since P  λ, it follows by the Radon-Nikodym the-
orem that there is a noise function F on the vector space E2
satisfying P(V) = !V F (~v) dλ(~v), for every V ⊆ E2. Now Let
Bδ(~v) ⊂ E2 be a ball of radius δ around ~v. It follows by the
Lebesgue differentiation theorem that
lim
δ→0
P(Bδ(~v))/λ(Bδ(~v)) = F (~v) a.e. in E2. (4)
In other words there is a null set N (empty or has λ(N) = 0)
such that the above equation is satisfied for every ~v ∈ E2 \ N .
Now consider any ~v,~v′ ∈ E2 \N such that ~v−~v′ ∈ VX. Then it
also holds that ~v′ − ~v ∈ VX. Since P satisfies `-privacy on X,
it holds by Theorem 1 that P(Bδ(~v)) ≤ e`(|~v′−~v|) P(τ~v′−~v(Bδ(~v))).
Note that τ~v′−~v(Bδ(~v)) is Bδ(~v′) and thereforeP(τ~v′−~v(Bδ(~v))) =
P(Bδ(~v′)). It is also easy to see that λ(Bδ(~v)) = λ(Bδ(~v′)).
Thus we have
P(Bδ(~v))/λ(Bδ(~v)) ≤ e`(|~v′−~v|)P(Bδ(~v′))/λ(Bδ(~v′)).
By taking the limits of the above equation when δ → 0
and substituting the two limits using Equation (4) we obtain
F (~v) ≤ e`(|~v−~v′ |) F (~v′).
Conversely, suppose that Inequality (3) holds for every
~v,~v′ ∈ E2 \ N such that ~v − ~v′ ∈ VX. Consider any fixed ~u ∈
VX. Then by this inequality, it holds thatF (~x) ≤ e`(|~u|)F (~x+~u)
a.e. in E2. Let ~y = ~x + ~u. Then by integrating the lat-
ter inequality on any set V we get P(V) = !V F (~x) dλ(~x) ≤
e`(|~u|)
!
τ~u(V)
F (~y) dλ(~y) = e`(|~u|) P(τ~u(V)). 
The above theorem is useful to check whether a given noise
function F satisfies (or not) `-privacy. In fact Condition 3 de-
scribes the constraints on the values of F to satisfy `-privacy.
This actually raises another issue, which is central to the ob-
jective of this paper. This issue concerns whether these con-
straints can be used to derive an “optimal” noise function. In
general, the answer is negative because for any F satisfying
`-privacy, Condition 3 may be violated for some null set N
that may be anywhere in E2. In other words, if we want to
construct an optimal noise function, then for any ~v,~v′ ∈ E2
such that ~v − ~v′ ∈ VX, we do not know if the inequality in 3
should hold for the values of F at ~v,~v′ or not. However, the
answer to the above question is positive if the values of F at
the vectors inN can be “regulated” such that (3) holds every-
where in E2. In this case, we would have a strict condition
that is satisfied for every pair ~v,~v′. It turns out that such “reg-
ulation” is possible if the distinguishability function is regular
as we define in the following.
Definition 3 (Regular distinguishability functions). A dis-
tinguishability function ` is said to be regular if for every
~v1,~v2,~v3 ∈ E2, it holds that `(|~v1−~v3|) ≤ `(|~v1−~v2|)+`(|~v2−~v3|).
Note that |~v1 − ~v3| is a metric on vectors and therefore
it respects the well known triangle inequality |~v1 − ~v3| ≤
|~v1 − ~v2| + |~v2 − ~v3|. Therefore by Definition 3, a distinguisha-
bility function ` is regular if the triangle inequality for vec-
tors still holds when `(.) is applied to every one of its terms.
An instance of regular distinguishability functions is obtained
when the distinguishability is proportional to the above metric
(i.e., `(d) =  d). This function describes exactly the notion of
-geo-indistinguishability [1], for which we describe an opti-
mal noise function in Section 7.1. In general, for any regular
distinguishability function `, the following theorem confirms
that every noise function F can be always regulated to satisfy
the privacy Condition 3 everywhere in E2.
Theorem 3 ((regulating noise functions). Let ` be a regular
distinguishability function. Then for every domain of loca-
tions X and every noise function F satisfying `-privacy on X,
there is a noise function F ′ = F a.e. in E2 such that for all
vectors ~v,~v′ ∈ E2 it holds
F ′(~v) ≤ e`(|~v−~v′ |) F ′(~v′) whenever ~v − ~v′ ∈ VX. (5)
Proof. Let ` be regular, and for any set of locations X let F
be a noise function satisfying `-privacy on X. According to
Theorem 2 there is a null set N ⊂ E2 such that for every
~x, ~x′ ∈ E2 \ N it holds
F (~x) ≤ e`(|~x−~x′ |) F (~x′) whenever ~x − ~x′ ∈ VX.
Define F ′ as follows. For every ~x ∈ E2 \N , let F ′(~x) = F (~x),
and for every~y ∈ N letF ′(~y) = inf{ e`(|~y−~x|) F (~x) : ~x ∈ E2\N}.
Note that this infimum exists because E2 \N is nonempty and
e`(|~y−~x|) F (~x) is lower bounded by 0. Observe also that F ′ = F
a.e. In the following we show that Inequality (5) holds for
every two vectors in E2. First, it is easy to see that for all
~x, ~x′ ∈ E2 \ N , Inequality (5) holds since F ′ = F at these
vectors. Now for every ~y ∈ N and ~x ∈ E2 \ N , it holds by
the definition of F ′ that F ′(~y) ≤ e`(|~y−~x|) F ′(~x). Based on the
hypothesis that ` is regular, we also claim for every ~y ∈ N
that
sup{e−`(|~y−~x|) F (~x) : ~x ∈ E2 \ N} ≤
inf{e`(|~y−~x|) F (~x) : ~x ∈ E2 \ N} (6)
which implies that e−`(|~y−~x|) F ′(~x) ≤ F ′(~y) for all ~y ∈ N and
~x ∈ E2 \ N . Thus we conclude that Inequality (5) holds for
every ~y ∈ N and ~x ∈ E2 \ N . We prove Inequality (6) as
follows. Suppose this inequality does not hold for some ~y ∈
N . Then there are ~x, ~x′ ∈ E2 \ N such that e−`(|~y−~x|) F (~x) >
e`(|~y−~x′ |) F (~x′), i.e. F (~x) > e`(|~y−~x′ |)+`(|~y−~x|) F (~x′). Since it also
holds that `(|~y − ~x′|) + `(|~y − ~x|) ≥ `(|~x′ − ~x|) because ` is
regular, we obtain F (~x) > e`(|~x′−~x|) F (~x′) which contradicts
with the fact that F (~x) ≤ e`(|~x′−~x|) F (~x′) since ~x, ~x′ ∈ E2 \ N .
Finally consider any ~y, ~y′ ∈ N . We show that F ′(~y′) ≤
e`(|~y′−~y|)F ′(~y). Consider any arbitrary small δ > 0. By the
definition of F ′(~y), there must be ~xδ ∈ E2 \ N such that
F ′(~y) ≥ e`(|~y−~xδ |) F (~xδ) − δ. Recalling that F (~xδ) = F ′(~xδ),
and using the inequality F ′(~y′) ≤ e`(|~y′−~xδ |) F ′(~xδ) which was
already proved, we obtainF ′(~y′) ≤ e`(|~y′−~xδ |)−`(|~y−~xδ |)(F ′(~y)+δ).
Since ` is regular, it holds that `(|~y′−~xδ|)−`(|~y−~xδ|) ≤ `(|~y′−~y|).
Therefore F ′(~y′) ≤ e`(|~y′−~y|)(F ′(~y) + δ) for every δ > 0. Tak-
ing the limits of this inequality as δ → 0 yields F ′(~y′) ≤
e`(|~y′−~y|) F ′(~y). 
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Theorem 3 allows us to assume without loss of general-
ity that the privacy Constraints 5 are satisfied for every pair
~v,~v′ ∈ E2. In fact since F ′ = F almost everywhere, the in-
tegrals of these two functions are the same on any subset of
E2. This means that F ′ is (similar to F ) a valid pdf and also
has the same expected loss of F . As mentioned earlier, this
conclusion is useful when we derive the optimal noise func-
tion satisfying `-privacy for some domain X, because we do
not need to consider noise functions in which (5) is violated
on a null set.
4.2 Circular noise functions
A noise function FR is called “circular” if all noise vectors
having the same magnitude are drawn with the same prob-
ability density [11]. This probability density is determined
by an underlying function R : [0,∞) → R+, which we call
the “radial” of FR. Thus, for every vector ~v it holds that
FR(~v) = R(|~v|). In this case, it is easy to express the expected
loss of FR with respect to a loss function L as
Ψ(FR,L) =
∫ ∞
0
R(r)L(r) 2pir dr. (7)
It is also easy to ensure that FR assigns total probability 1 to
all vectors in E2 by the following constraint that we coin as
the “total probability law”.∫ ∞
0
R(r) 2pir dr = 1. (8)
We now describe the condition on a circular noise function
FR to satisfy `-privacy for a domain X. This condition de-
pends on the set ΩX = {(|~v|, |~v′|) : ~v,~v′ ∈ E2, ~v′ − ~v ∈ VX}
that captures every two noise magnitudes required to have
a restricted distinguishability from each other. This distin-
guishability for a pair of magnitudes (r, r′) ∈ ΩX must ensure
that every two vectors ~v,~v′ having these magnitudes are prop-
erly indistinguishable from each other. Therefore the distin-
guishability for (r, r′) is exactly the “minimal” distinguisha-
bility `X(r, r′) defined as `X(r, r′) = min { `(|~v − ~v′|) : ~v,~v′ ∈
E2, r = |~v|, r′ = |~v′|, ~v − ~v′ ∈ VX}.
Theorem 4 (`-privacy of circular noise functions). A circular
noise function FR having a radial R satisfies `-privacy on a
domain of locations X if and only if there is a discrete set of
noise magnitudesN ′ ⊂ [0,∞) such that for all r, r′ ∈ [0,∞) \
N ′ it holds
R(r) ≤ e`X(r,r′) R(r′) whenever (r, r′) ∈ ΩX. (9)
Proof. Suppose that FR satisfies `-privacy on X. Then its
noise distribution P also satisfies it. By the circularity of FR,
the probability of any ball of radius δ around a vector ~v ∈ E2
depends only on the magnitude r of ~v (and δ) regardless of
its direction. Let Pr,δ denote this probability. Now P satisfies
`-privacy if and only if it satisfies the condition of Theorem 1
that can be written for Pr,δ as
Pr,δ ≤ e`X(r,r′)Pr′,δ
for all (r, r′) ∈ ΩX = {(|~v|, |~v′|) : ~v,~v′ ∈ E2, ~v′ − ~v ∈ VX} and
`X(r, r′) = min { `(|~v−~v′|) : ~v,~v′ ∈ E2, r = |~v|, r′ = |~v′|, ~v−~v′ ∈
VX}. This condition (according to Theorem 1) considers all
vectors ~v,~v′ such that ~v −~v′ ∈ VX and having the magnitudes
r, r′ respectively. The minimum distinguishability `X(r, r′) is
taken to ensure that the distinguishability between every ~v,~v′
is properly upper-bounded by `(|~v − ~v′|). By the Lebesgue
differentiation theorem, the derivative of P with respect to the
Lebesgue measure λ on E2 exists and is equal to FR almost
everywhere in E2. By the circularity of FR, this means that
for a discrete set N ′ of magnitudes, it holds for every r ∈
[0,∞)\N ′ that limδ→0 Pr,δ/piδ2 = R(r). Applying this limit to
the two sides of the above inequality, we obtain the condition
stated by the theorem.
Conversely we show that this condition implies that FR sat-
isfies `-privacy as follows. For every ~v,~v′ such that ~v − ~v′ ∈
VX, there must be r, r′ ∈ [0,∞)\N ′ such that r = |~v|, r′ = |~v′|.
Thus (r, r′) ∈ ΩX, hence R(r) ≤ e`X(r,r′)R(r′). Since `X(r, r′) ≤
`(|~v − ~v′|), we have FR(~v) ≤ e`(|~v−~v′ |)FR(~v′). Note that this in-
equality holds for all vectors in E2 except those having mag-
nitudes in N ′. Thus, this inequality holds for all vectors in
E2 \ N where N is the set composed of the union of the dis-
crete set of circles having their radii inN ′. SinceN is clearly
a null set in E2, it follows from Theorem 2 that FR satisfies
`-privacy. 
The minimal distinguishability `X(r, r′) depends, by its def-
inition, on X and `. For example, if X is the entire space of
locations R2, and the distinguishability `(d) is increasing with
d, it is easy to see that `X(r, r′) is exactly `(|r − r′|).
Based on Theorem 4, the trade-off between the location pri-
vacy provided by a noise function and its utility can be ob-
served. In particular, if the incurred loss increases with the
noise magnitude, then to provide a reasonable utility, the noise
function should intuitively assign high probability densities
to short noise vectors to reduce the loss. However in view
of Theorem 4 if this function is too biased, it may violate `-
privacy. Optimizing this trade-off is therefore an interesting
issue that we investigate in our work.
Now, we proceed by highlighting an important merit of cir-
cular noise functions when the domain X is a “disk” in the
planar spaceR2. Informally, every noise functionF satisfying
`-privacy can be replaced by a circular one FR that both pro-
vides the same utility of F and also satisfies `-privacy. While
this result was proved in [11] under a continuity assumption
(on noise functions) described in Section 3.2, the following
theorem removes the need for this assumption and establishes
that result in general when the distinguishability function is
regular. Furthermore, this theorem gives a stronger statement
about FR: its radial R satisfies the condition (9) of `-privacy
without exceptions on a discrete set of magnitudes. In this
case, we say that FR “strictly” satisfies `-privacy on X.
Theorem 5 (Generality of circular noise functions). Let ` be
a regular distinguishability function, and X be a disk in R2.
For every noise function F satisfying `-privacy for X and for
every loss functionL, there exists a circular noise function FR
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(with a radial R) such that Ψ(FR,L) = Ψ(F ,L) and strictly
satisfies `-privacy on X, which means that
R(r) ≤ e`X(r,r′) R(r′) ∀(r, r′) ∈ ΩX.
Proof. Since ` is regular, it holds by Theorem 3 that for every
noise function satisfying `-privacy there is a noise function
F that satisfies Inequality (5) for every two vectors in E2. Let
FR be a circular noise function (with a radial R) defined on E2
using the polar coordinates (r, φ) of every vector as FR(r, φ) =
R(r) = 1/(2pi) ∫ 2pi0 F (r, θ) dθ. By this definition R satisfies
the total probability law (8) and is therefore a valid radial. It
can be also verified that Ψ(FR,L) = Ψ(F ,L) using Equations
(7) and (1) (as in the proof of Theorem 15 in [11]). Finally,
using the same argument in the proof of Theorem 23 in [11],
it follows that R(r) ≤ e`X(r,r′) R(r′) for all (r, r′) ∈ ΩX. 
Finally, an important strength of the approach is that sam-
pling a noise vector from circular functions is very simple
compared to sampling from non-circular ones. A generic al-
gorithm for this sampling is described in [11].
5 Noise distributions on continuous re-
gions
In Section 4, we have established the conditions for a noise
distribution, and its corresponding noise function to satisfy `-
privacy on an arbitrary domain X. In the following, we focus
on the case whenX is a continuous region with a nonzero area
such as a country, a city or in general a region that contains a
dense set of points of interests. In this case we find, under a
mild condition on X and the distinguishability function `, that
satisfying the conditions of `-privacy on X is actually equiv-
alent to satisfying these conditions more widely on the entire
planar space R2.
Theorem 6 (Satisfying `-privacy for continuous regions). Let
` be a distinguishability function satisfying for some distance
d0 > 0 that `(d0 + d) ≥ `(d0) + `(d) for all d > 0. Let also X
be any region that contains a disk of diameter d0. In this case
a noise distribution P satisfies `-privacy on X if and only if it
satisfies `-privacy on R2.
Proof. It is clear that if a noise distribution P satisfies `-
privacy on R2, it must satisfy it on X since X ⊆ R2.
Conversely, suppose that P satisfies `-privacy on X and `
satisfies the stated condition. We show in this case that P
must satisfy `-privacy for R2. More precisely, we demonstrate
that the condition of `-privacy described by Inequality (2) is
satisfied on the domain R2. Observe that VR2 is the entire
vector space E2, and therefore for every two points i, j, we
have j − i ∈ VR2 . Therefore, we proceed by showing that for
any i, j
P(V) ≤ e`(| j−i|)P(τ( j−i)(V)) ∀V ⊆ E2.
If | j − i| ≤ d0, it is easy to see that j − i ∈ VX and there-
fore the above inequality holds since P satisfies `-privacy on
X. If otherwise | j − i| > d0, there is a sequence of points
i0, i1, . . . , in+1 on the line connecting i and j such that i0 = i
and in+1 = j, and every successive two points are d0 apart,
except i0, i1 which are at most d0 apart, i.e. |ik+1 − ik | = d0 for
k = 1, 2, . . . , n, and |i1 − i0| ≤ d0. Since P satisfies `-privacy
on X and ik+1 − ik ∈ VX, we have
P(V) ≤ e`(|ik+1−ik |)P(τ(ik+1−ik)(V)), ∀V ⊆ E2, 0 ≤ k ≤ n
which implies that
P(V) ≤ e∑nk=0 `(|ik+1−ik |)P(τ(∑nk=0 ik+1−ik)(V)).
Since `(d) + `(d0) ≤ `(d0 + d) for all d > 0, it follows that∑n
k=0 `(|ik+1− ik |) ≤ `(|in+1− i0|). It is also clear that
∑n
k=0 ik+1−
ik = j − i. Thus P(V) ≤ e`(| j−i|)P(τ( j−i)(V)). 
The above theorem describes a condition on the distin-
guishability function `(.) that can be informally described as
follows. For distances ≥ d0, the distinguishability `(.) in-
creases by a rate that is higher or at least the same as its rate for
distances < d0. There are various practical situations in which
the risk of distinguishing the location of the user is modeled
by a distinguishability function having the above behavior. In
the following, we give some examples of such scenarios.
-geo-indistinguishability [1]. As we mentioned earlier, `-
privacy is instantiated to the notion of -geo-indistinguish-
ability if the distinguishability function is defined as `(d) =
 d. Observe in this case that any d0 > 0 satisfies the condition
`(d0 + d) = `(d0) + `(d) for all d > 0. Remarkably, this con-
dition is satisfied with every non-zero value for d0. This im-
plies by Theorem 6 that satisfying -geo-indistinguishability
for any region with a non-zero area is equivalent to having the
same protection on the entire space. In Section 7.1, we will
describe in more details the intuition of this distinguishability
function, and also derive the optimal noise function for it.
D-restricted distinguishability functions. Consider a user
who requires his location to be indistinguishable from others
situated within a certain proximity D from him, while allow-
ing his location to be distinguishable from positions beyond
that proximity. This requirement corresponds to a family of
distinguishability functions agreeing on that `(d) = ∞ for all
d > D, while they differ from each other in the specification
of `(d) for d ∈ [0,D]. For every member of this family, the
condition of Theorem 6 holds with d0 = D. In fact, it is easy
to see in this case that `(d0 + d) = ∞ > `(d0) + `(d) for all
d > 0.
In the following, we show an important consequence of
Theorem 6. In fact, it turns out that for any region X and dis-
tinguishability function ` that satisfy the conditions of Theo-
rem 6, the class of circular noise functions, presented in Sec-
tion 4.2, is general enough to provide the same privacy and
utility levels that are provided by other noise functions.
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5.1 Generality of circular noise functions
As mentioned in Section 4.2, circular noise functions display
the important feature that noise vectors having the same mag-
nitude have also the same probability density. Based on this
uniformity, it is shown by Theorem 5 that when ` is regular
and X is a “disk”, there is always an `-private circular func-
tion achieving the same expected loss incurred by another `-
private (non-circular) one. Theorem 6 allows us to strengthen
this statement to hold not only for disks, but also for broader
regions if the conditions that were stated in that theorem for
X and ` are satisfied.
Theorem 7 (Generality of circular noise functions on contin-
uous regions). Let ` be a regular distinguishability function
satisfying for some distance d0 > 0 that `(d0+d) ≥ `(d0)+`(d)
for all d > 0. Let also X be any region that contains a disk of
diameter d0. For every noise function F satisfying `-privacy
on X, there is a circular noise function FR that strictly satis-
fies `-privacy on R2 and has the same expected loss as F .
Proof. Let F be a noise function satisfying `-privacy on X.
Since ` and X satisfy the conditions of Theorem 6, it fol-
lows that F must also satisfy `-privacy on the entire space
R2. Since ` is regular, and R2 is circular (with infinite diam-
eter), it holds by Theorem 5 that there is a circular function
that strictly satisfies `-privacy for R2, while having the same
expected loss of F . 
According to Theorem 7, if the given conditions on ` and
X are satisfied, there is no need to use a complex non-circular
noise function to sample noise vectors while satisfying `-
privacy. The main reason for this is that there is always a
circular function FR that satisfies the same privacy require-
ment without any penalty on the expected loss. This circular
function guarantees `-privacy not only on X but also on the
entire space R2. Moreover, the conditions of `-privacy, stated
by Theorem 4, are strictly satisfied (i.e. without exceptions
for any set of noise magnitudes). These conclusions are im-
portant in particular for identifying an optimal noise function
that satisfies a given distinguishability function. As a case
study we will consider in Section 7.1 the instance `(d) =  d
corresponding to the notion of -geo-indistinguishability pro-
posed by the authors of [1], and use the aforementioned re-
sults to identify the optimal noise function for this instance.
To achieve, we formally define in the following section opti-
mal noise functions and discuss their existence.
6 Optimal noise functions
Since in general, there are many noise functions satisfying
a given instance of `-privacy on a specific region X, we are
interested to find the “optimal” one that maximizes the utility
(i.e., minimize the expected value of a specific loss function).
More precisely, we consider a space Ω of noise functions that
satisfy `-privacy on X and define the optimal members in this
space in the following manner.
Definition 4 (Optimal members in a space of noise functions).
Consider a distinguishability function `, a domain of loca-
tionsX, and a loss functionL. Let Ω be a space of noise func-
tions that satisfy `-privacy on X. A member F ∈ Ω is said to
be optimal in Ω forXwith respect toL if Ψ(F ,L) ≤ Ψ(F ′,L)
for every F ′ ∈ Ω.
In principle, it is not always guaranteed that the given space
of noise functions includes an optimal member even if this
space is non-empty. Stated differently, it may happen that for
every noise function in this space there is another member
that has a lower expected loss without ever reaching an op-
timal one. In the following, we address this issue and aim
to identify sufficient conditions ensuring the existence of an
optimal noise function for a given distinguishability function
`(.), a given region X and a loss function L. In our reasoning,
we want `(.), X and also L to be arbitrary. Therefore, in-
stead of restricting the setting of these variables, we describe
the conditions on the considered space Ω to have an optimal
member.
Conditions on the given space of noise functions.
1. The first condition on Ω is that its members are uniformly
bounded. More precisely, there is some bound M > 0
such that every F ∈ Ω satisfies F (~v) ≤ M almost every-
where in E2. This property is essential in certain cases
to ensure that Ω admits an optimal member. For exam-
ple, let the region X be a single point in R2 and the loss
function be increasing with the noise magnitude. In this
situation, an optimal member of Ω can be obtained by
assigning as much probability as possible to vectors hav-
ing small magnitudes. Figure 2 illustrates this situation
for various values of the bound M. It is clear from this
figure that the optimal noise function (described by its
radial R(r)) depends on M. However, if M = ∞ (i.e.,
Ω is not uniformly bounded), the expected loss is mini-
mized by assigning probability 1 to the zero-magnitude
vector, but clearly in this case there is no noise (density)
function.
2. For any noise distribution P and a noise magnitude r,
let P(> r) be the probability of sampling a noise vec-
tor for which the magnitude is larger than r. Based on
the fact that the total probability assigned by P to all
noise vectors in E2 is 1, it is intuitive that the probability
P(> r) converges to 0 as r → ∞. Using a function ρ to
precisely describe this convergence, we can parameter-
ize this property on ρ, and say that P is ρ-tight. More
formally, we have the following.
Definition 5 (ρ-tight noise distribution). Consider a
function ρ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] such that limr→∞ ρ(r) = 0.
A noise distribution P is ρ-tight if for every noise magni-
tude r ≥ 0, it holds that P(> r) ≤ ρ(r).
Using the above property, we describe a second condi-
tion ensuring that Ω has an optimal member. More pre-
cisely, we require that there is a function ρ such that all
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Figure 2: The radials of optimal noise functions when X con-
sists of a single point.
noise distributions of the members of Ω are uniformly
ρ-tight. This means that they have the same conver-
gence rate (determined by ρ) for the probabilities of large
noise2.
Conditions on the loss function. In addition to the above
conditions on the considered space of noise functions, we also
need a slight restriction on the loss function L. Precisely, it
is required to be lower semi-continuous at every r0 ∈ [0,∞).
This condition is written as lim infr→r0 L(r) ≥ L(r0), which
means that in every neighborhood around r0, the loss func-
tion L has a minimum value. This condition is fundamental
for the extreme value theorem that we use to prove that the
expected loss attains its infimum in a space of noise func-
tions. This condition is not too restrictive since it needs to be
checked only at the discontinuities of L. In particular, it is
enough to define the values of L at every discontinuity r0 to
be lim infr→r0 L(r) to satisfy the lower semi-continuity.
Based on the above conditions, we are now able to describe
a space of noise functions that satisfy `-privacy on X. This
space is defined by certain parameters, namely a bound M > 0
and a function ρ, and therefore is written as ΩM, ρ. The follow-
ing theorem shows that if ΩM, ρ is non-empty, then it has an
optimal member with respect to any lower semi-continuous
loss L.
Theorem 8 (Existence of optimal noise functions). Consider
a distinguishability function `, a set of locations X and a
lower semi-continuous loss function L. Consider also any
M > 0, and any ρ : [0,∞) → [0, 1] with limr→∞ ρ(r) = 0.
Let ΩM, ρ be the space of all noise functions that are bounded
by M almost everywhere in E2, correspond to ρ-tight distribu-
tions and satisfy `-privacy on X. If ΩM, ρ is non-empty, it has
an optimal member for `, X with respect to L.
2Uniform ρ-tightness of a collection of distributions is a stronger version
of “tightness” (cf., page 59 in [3]), which is not parametric on ρ, and requires
the probability masses to uniformly converge to zero outside any compact
subset of E2.
Proof. Let D be the collection of every noise distribution
that has a corresponding noise function (i.e., a pdf) in ΩM, ρ.
Therefore, the expected loss is a real-valued function on the
elements ofD, and written as Ψ(P,L) for every P ∈ D. Now,
we proceed by showing that Ψ(.,L) attains a minimum value
inD.
By the extreme value theorem, Ψ(.,L) attains a mini-
mum in D if the latter is non-empty, relatively compact and
closed and finally Ψ(.,L) is lower bounded and lower semi-
continuous in D. Since D is non-empty (because ΩM, ρ is),
we prove in the following lines the other properties forD and
Ψ(.,L) using the weak convergence of probability distribu-
tions (known also as the convergence in distribution).
Relative compactness: Since limr→∞ ρ(r) = 0, for every
σ > 0, there is rσ such that ρ(rσ) < σ. Since also everyP ∈ D
is ρ-tight, we have by Definition 5 that P(> rσ) ≤ ρ(rσ) < σ.
Since the set of noise vectors having magnitudes ≤ rσ is a
compact subset of E2, it follows thatD is a tight collection of
probability measures. Finally, by Prokhorov’s theorem (cf.,
page 59 in [3]), we conclude thatD is relatively compact.
Closeness: Whenever a sequence {Pn}n∈N in D converges
weakly toP, which we write asPn → P, we want to show that
P ∈ D. First, we show that P has a density function. Accord-
ing to Portmanteau’s theorem (cf. [30, Theorem 1.3.4, p 18]),
every open set A ⊆ E2 satisfies P(A) ≤ lim infn→∞ Pn(A).
Since for every n ∈ N, the noise function Fn of Pn is bounded
by M almost everywhere in E2, we have P(A) ≤ M λ(A), in
which λ(A) is the area (i.e., Lebesgue measure) of A. More
generally, we have
P(B) ≤ P(A) ≤ M λ(A), ∀B ⊆ A. (10)
Using the fact that λ(B) = inf{λ(A) : A ⊇ B, A open} (because
λ is an outer regular measure), we get P(B) = 0 when λ(B) =
0. Therefore by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, there is a prob-
ability density function F for the limit distributionP. We also
show that F is bounded by M almost everywhere in E2. Con-
sider a ball B~v ⊂ E2 around a vector ~v. By the Lebesgue Dif-
ferentiation Theorem, F (~v) = limλ(B~v)→0 P(B~v)/λ(B~v) almost
everywhere in E2. Since by Equation (10) P(B~v) ≤ M λ(B~v)
for every B~v, we obtain F (~v) ≤ M almost everywhere in E2.
Similarly, we show that P is ρ-tight. It was proved that
P(B) = 0 when λ(B) = 0 for all B ⊂ E2. Therefore P assigns
probability 0 to the boundary of every set V ⊆ E2 (denoted by
∂V), and it holds by Portmanteau’s theorem that
lim
n→∞Pn(V) = P(V), ∀V ⊆ E
2. (11)
Since every Pn is ρ-tight, Pn(> r) ≤ ρ(r) for all r ≥ 0. There-
fore, we imply by taking the limits and using Equation (11)
that P satisfies this inequality too, and hence is ρ-tight. It re-
mains to show that P satisfies `-privacy on X. Since every Pn
satisfies `-privacy, we have by Equation (2)
Pn(V) ≤ e`(|~u|)Pn(τ~u(V)) ∀V ⊆ E2,∀~u ∈ VX.
By applying the limits to the above inequality and using Equa-
tion (11), we obtain P(V) ≤ e`(|~u|) P(τ~u(V)), which means that
P satisfies `-privacy on X. ThusD is closed.
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Boundness from below and lower-semi-continuity: Let Y
be a random noise vector taking its values from E2. For
all distributions Pn ∈ D, it is easy to see that Ψ(Pn,L)
is bounded from below by 0 since it is the expected value
(with respect to Pn) of L(|Y |) that has this property. Since
L is lower semi-continuous on [0,∞), it is clear that L(|.|)
is also lower semi-continuous on E2. Thus, it follows by
Portmanteau’s theorem that every sequence Pn → P satis-
fies EP[L(|Y |)] ≤ lim infn→∞ EPn [L(|Y |)], which means that
Ψ(.,L) is lower semi-continuous onD. 
Remark that for any ` and X, and any setting for the pa-
rameters M, ρ, there are always noise functions that are not
members of the space ΩM, ρ, but yet satisfy `-privacy on X. In
other words, ΩM, ρ is restricted compared to the space of all
noise functions that satisfy `-privacy. However, at the cost of
this restriction ΩM, ρ has the important feature that it admits an
optimal member regardless of the choice of ` and X. Never-
theless, if specific assumptions are made on `, X, and the loss
L, a space that is larger than ΩM, ρ may also admit an optimal
member. For example as shown in the following section, if
the distinguishability takes the form `(d) =  d, the domain
X has a non-zero area, and the loss L is increasing, the entire
space of functions that satisfy `-privacy on X has an optimal
member.
In conclusion, Theorem 8 opens a new avenue to explore
the optimal noise functions, at least in the scope of ΩM, ρ, for
various privacy requirements of the users on continuous re-
gions. The analytical forms of such optimal noise functions
depend indeed on the user-specific setting for ` and X and L.
7 A case study: -geo-
indistinguishability
The notion of -geo-indistinguishability [1] is an instance of
`-privacy with the distinguishability function `(d) =  d. In
this setting, the parameter  quantifies the allowed distin-
guishability for a unit distance, which corresponds to the max-
imum distinguishability between two points separated by one
distance unit3.
-geo-indistinguishability models the situation in which the
user requires to restrict the distinguishability between his lo-
cation and every point at distance d > 0 from him while en-
abling this restriction to be linearly relaxed as the distance d
increases.
7.1 Optimal noise function for -geo-
indistinguishability
We consider an arbitrary geographical region X that has a
non-zero area, and aim to find the optimal noise function for
X with respect to -geo-indistinguishability and an arbitrary
increasing loss function L.
3 Since the distinguishability is unitless (as it is a ratio between two prob-
abilities), the unit of  is the reciprocal of the distance unit (e.g., km−1) and
its numerical value depends indeed on the chosen unit for the distance.
In the sense of Definition 4 of optimal noise functions, we
will implicitly assume Ω to be the entire space of noise func-
tions satisfying -geo-indistinguishability on X. This means
that we require a noise function that minimizes the expected
loss while satisfying -geo-indistinguishability on X.
The main tool to achieve this objective is Theorem 7 for
which the assumptions are satisfied in the case of -geo-
indistinguishability. More precisely, it is easy to see that the
distinguishability function `(d) =  d is regular, and also sat-
isfies `(d0 + d) ≥ `(d0) + `(d) for every d0 > 0. Therefore,
this theorem enables us first to focus only on circular noise
functions and to reason about their radials. It also helps us
to abstract from the geometry of the domain X and focus on
satisfying the privacy constraints on the entire space R2. Fi-
nally, we can assume without loss of generality that these con-
straints are strictly satisfied for every pair of noise magnitudes
in [0,∞).
The first step towards achieving this objective is the follow-
ing proposition that states that bounded and continuous circu-
lar noise functions are general enough to capture the required
optimal noise function.
Proposition 1 (Bounded continuous circular functions are
sufficient). Let X be any region with a non-zero area. For ev-
ery noise function F satisfying -geo-indistinguishability on
X, and any loss function, there is a bounded and continuous
circular noise function FR (with radial R) that has the same
expected loss of F . Furthermore, this function strictly satis-
fies -geo-indistinguishability on R2 ,which means that
R(r) ≤ e |r−r′ | R(r′) ∀r, r′ ∈ [0,∞). (12)
Proof. By Definition 3, it is clear that `(d) =  d is regular.
In addition, since the area of X is non-zero, it must con-
tain an arbitrarily small disk with diameter d0 > 0. It also
holds that `(d0 + d) = `(d0) + `(d) for all d > 0. Thus,
it follows from Theorem 7 that for every noise function F
satisfying -geo-indistinguishability on X, there is a circu-
lar noise function FR, with a radial R, providing the same
expected loss of F . Furthermore, this function satisfies -
geo-indistinguishability “strictly” on R2 in the sense of The-
orem 5. Observe that ΩR2 = {(r, r′) : r, r′ ∈ [0,∞)}, and
`R2 (r, r′) =  |r − r′|. Therefore R satisfies Inequality (12).
Using this inequality, we show that R is bounded as follows.
By combining Inequality (12) and the total probability law 8,
we obtain R(r′) ∫ ∞r′ e−(r−r′) 2pir dr ≤ 1 for every r′ ≥ 0 . This
yields that R(r′) ≤ 2/2pi(1 + r′) ≤ 2/2pi.
Finally, to prove that R is continuous everywhere in [0,∞),
we consider any r′ ∈ [0,∞) and show that limr→r′ |R(r) −
R(r′)| = 0. By Inequality (12), it is clear that e−|r−r′ | R(r′) ≤
R(r) ≤ e |r−r′ | R(r′). Thus,
R(r) − R(r′) ≤ (e|r−r′ | − 1)R(r′) if R(r) ≥ R(r′),
R(r′) − R(r) ≤ (1 − e−|r−r′ |)R(r′) if R(r) < R(r′).
These two inequalities imply that
|R(r) − R(r′)| ≤ max{(e|r−r′ | − 1), (1 − e−|r−r′ |)} R(r′).
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Taking the limits of the latter inequality when r tends to r′
leads to limr→r′ |R(r) − R(r′)| = 0. 
Proposition 1 is an important outcome of the general anal-
ysis presented early in Sections 4 and 5. In particular, we
used the results of that analysis to derive from the specifica-
tion of the distinguishability function `(d) =  d several an-
alytical properties on the noise functions that are candidates
to be optimal with respect to any loss function and any region
having a non-zero area. In previous works [11], these prop-
erties (specifically the continuity and the boundedness), were
taken as assumptions limiting the range of considered noise
functions. In contrast, in our current analysis these proper-
ties are rather derived from the definition of the considered
distinguishability function `.
In the following, we go one step further by showing that
a specific circular noise function, called the planar Laplace
function, is optimal for every geographical region having a
non-zero area, and also with respect to every increasing loss
function. For a user-defined value of the privacy parame-
ter  > 0, the radial of this function decreases exponen-
tially with the noise magnitude r and precisely has the form
R(r) = 2/(2pi) e−r. In Figure 3, the Laplace noise function F
on the noise vectors E2 and its radial R on the magnitudes of
these vectors are illustrated for  = 1/200. While this function
was originally introduced in [1] as a candidate function to sat-
isfy -geo-indistinguishability, we show by the following the-
orem that it is furthermore optimal under the aforementioned
conditions.
Theorem 9 (Optimality of the planar Laplace function for
-geo-indistinguishability). For any region X having a non-
zero area, and any increasing loss function L, the Laplace
noise function defined by the radial R(r) = 2/(2pi) e−r with
the parameter  > 0 is optimal for X with respect to -geo-
indistinguishability and L.
Proof. According to Proposition 1, it is sufficient to show that
the Laplace function FR that has the radialR(r) = 2/(2pi) e−r
is optimal in the class C consisting of every circular function
strictly satisfying -geo-indistinguishability on R2, and has a
continuous radial.
First it is easy to verify that FR is a member of C since its
radial R is clearly continuous everywhere in [0,∞) and satis-
fies Inequality (12). Thus, it remains to show that FR satisfies
Ψ(FR,L) ≤ Ψ(FR′ ,L) for every other circular function FR′ in
C.
Since both R and R′ are continuous on [0,∞), their dif-
ference g(r) = R(r) − R′(r) is also continuous on [0,∞). If
R,R′ are not identical, there must be r1, r2 ∈ [0,∞) such that
g(r1) > 0 and g(r2) < 0 because otherwise the total probabil-
ity law 8 would not hold for either R or R′. As a consequence
by the intermediate value theorem, there must be r¯ between r1
and r2, such that g(r¯) = 0, i.e. R(r¯) = R′(r¯). It also holds that
R(r) = R(r¯) e−(r−r¯) for all r ∈ [0,∞). Using these equalities
along with the assumption that R′ satisfies Inequality (12), we
can write
∀r ≤ r¯ : R′(r) ≤ R′(r¯) e−(r−r¯) = R(r¯) e−(r−r¯) = R(r), (13)
∀r > r¯ : R′(r) ≥ R′(r¯) e−(r−r¯) = R(r¯) e−(r−r¯) = R(r). (14)
We can also write
Ψ(FR,L) − Ψ(FR′ ,L) =
∫ ∞
0
L(r) (R(r) − R′(r)) 2pir dr.
For all r ∈ [0,∞), it can be shown that L(r) (R(r) − R′(r)) ≤
L(r¯) (R(r) − R′(r)) as follows. If r ≤ r¯ thenL(r) ≤ L(r¯) since
L is increasing, and R(r) − R′(r) ≥ 0 by (13). I f otherwise
r > r¯ then L(r) ≥ L(r¯) and R(r) − R′(r) ≤ 0 by (14). Thus,
we conclude that
Ψ(FR,L)−Ψ(FR′ ,L) ≤ L(r¯)
(∫ ∞
0
(R(r) − R′(r)) 2pir dr) = 0
in which the final equality follows from the fact that both R
and R′ satisfy the total probability law 8. 
The result stated by the above theorem is strong in two as-
pects. First, the Laplace noise function is optimal for every
region having a non-zero area, regardless of the geometry and
the size of the considered region. Furthermore, this optimality
holds for all increasing loss functions, which are mostly used
to quantify the loss of LBS quality due to the obfuscation.
Thus, the user does not need to use a different noise function
when he moves to a different region or when he uses a dif-
ferent loss function. Since Theorem 9 describes the optimal
noise function for -geo-indistinguishability, it can be also in-
terpreted in terms of the symmetric mechanisms presented
earlier in Section 3.2. In particular, anyone of these mech-
anisms is based on a specific noise function used to sample
the added noise vectors. Therefore Theorem 9 identifies, un-
der the stated conditions, the optimal symmetric mechanism
satisfying -geo-indistinguishability. In the following subsec-
tion, we compare between this mechanism and the instances
of the other type of mechanisms, namely the non-symmetric
ones.
7.2 Comparison to non-symmetric mecha-
nisms on a coarse grid
As described earlier, a symmetric mechanism has the charac-
teristic that the probabilistic noise addition is independent of
the user’s location in the considered region X. In contrast,
a non-symmetric mechanism samples the added noise using a
noise distribution that depends on the real location of the user.
One advantage of the latter approach is that it is more flexible.
More specifically, the noise addition at every point of X may
be optimized using the user’s prior inX (i.e., the probability of
the user to visit each point) such that the resulting mechanism
has the minimum expected loss for the user while satisfying
the privacy constraints. However it is clear in this case that the
optimized non-symmetric mechanism depends on the consid-
ered region X, the user’s prior pi and the adopted loss func-
tion L. This means that if any of these parameters change,
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Figure 3: The planar Laplace noise function and its radial with  = 1/200.
the user’s device may need to compute another mechanism
to query the LBS. In contrast, the symmetric mechanism that
is based on the Laplace noise is optimal amongst symmet-
ric mechanisms due to Theorem 9), and is insensitive to the
changes of X,pi and L.
Another important issue is that constructing an optimal
non-symmetric mechanism is infeasible when the considered
region X is continuous, because in this case the number of
points in X would be too large to apply the traditional lin-
ear optimization techniques. As shown by [4], such difficulty
may be relaxed by discretizing X into a coarse grid having a
small number of cells, and approximating X by the centers of
these cells. In this case, using a specific prior pi on these cen-
ters, an optimal non-symmetric mechanism for pi can be con-
structed. While such a mechanism would by design satisfies
indistinguishability constraints between those centers, it does
not guarantee the indistinguishability between all points of the
original continuous region X. Moreover, while this mecha-
nism is optimal for a prior on the centers of the cells, it does
not necessarily provide reasonable utility when the user is not
at one of these centers. To compare the difference of utility
provided by symmetric versus non-symmetric mechanisms,
we experimentally compare in the following between the ex-
pected loss of a non-symmetric mechanism and the optimal
symmetric one based on the Laplace noise.
We consider a geographical regionX around the city of Los
Angeles. This region is bordered by the latitudes 33.9301,
34.1996 and the longitudes -118.5354, -118.1010, which
makes X extending 30km south-to-north and 40km west-to-
east. We then consider the symmetric mechanism that satisfies
-geo-indistinguishability on X and is optimal with respect to
the loss function L(r) = r that grows linearly with the noise
magnitude r. By Theorem 9, the noise function of this mech-
anism is the planar Laplace function equipped with the radial
R(r) = 2/(2pi) e−r. Thus, the expected loss of this mecha-
nism is easily evaluated using Equation (7) to be 2/. For the
comparison, we also construct a non-symmetric mechanism
satisfying -geo-indistinguishability on X. To facilitate opti-
mizing the expected loss of this mechanism for a given prior,
we split X into a coarse grid of 8 × 6 (i.e., 48) squared cells,
approximate every location in X by the center of the inclosing
cell and restrict the output of the mechanism to be one of these
centers. The required mechanism is then obtained by solv-
ing a linear program minimizing the expected loss for a given
prior pi on these centers, subject to 47 × 482 (i.e., 108 288)
inequality constraints to satisfy -geo-indistinguishability, in
addition to 48 equalities. For every value of  in the range
0.2 to 3.0 (with step size of 0.1), we construct this mechanism
for four priors corresponding to four users. Each prior is pre-
cisely the probability distribution of the corresponding user to
visit the individual 48 cells of X.
Construction of a prior using the Gowalla dataset.
Gowalla is a geosocial network in which the users deliber-
ately share their locations [23]. These shared locations have
been collected in the period from February 2009 to October
2010 to yield a dataset of 6 442 890 check-ins (locations) for
196 591 users. Every check-in is described by a record con-
sisting of the user identifier, the latitude and longitude of his
location and the time of checking-in. Using this dataset, we
compute the prior of a specific user on our grid of Los An-
geles by counting the number of his check-ins in every cell
relative to his total number of check-ins in the entire grid.
Results. Figure 4 plots the expected loss of the symmetric
and non-symmetric mechanisms for the considered four users
in Los Angeles. For each user, the solid curve corresponds
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to the symmetric mechanism, while the dashed curve corre-
sponds to the non-symmetric one.
From this figure, we can observed that the expected loss,
for the two mechanisms, is non-increasing as  grows. This
is intuitive because as the privacy requirement modeled by 
is relaxed, one can always find a mechanism that has a better
utility (i.e., lower expected loss). In particular, when the pri-
vacy is relatively strong (e.g.,  < 1), the expected loss of both
mechanisms is over 1.9 kilometer, and in this case the non-
symmetric mechanism has a lower error compared to the other
one. However, when the privacy level is more relaxed (e.g.,
 > 1), the expected loss of the symmetric mechanism with
the Laplace noise decreases at the rate 2/ to reach 0.66km
when  is 3.0, while the expected loss of the non-symmetric
mechanisms tends to stabilize at a certain level around 2.0km.
This effect is due to the fact that the non-symmetric mech-
anism always maps the user’s real location to the center of
the enclosing cell, making the expected loss in the best case
(i.e., with no obfuscation) be exactly the average distance be-
tween the user’s real location and the center of his current
cell. This level of saturation depends on the cell size and is
expected to decrease as the regionX is fine-grained to smaller
cells. However, optimizing the expected loss would be com-
putationally more expensive in this case. As a conclusion,
when the privacy is relatively strong, the level of expected loss
for these two mechanisms is always high and in this case non-
symmetric mechanisms may be favored. In contrast, when the
required privacy level is more relaxed, the symmetric mecha-
nism provides more reasonable levels of utility, compared to
the non-symmetric mechanisms that are in all cases restricted
by the limited computation resources.
7.3 Remapping the outputs of a symmetric
mechanism
While a symmetric mechanism on the continuous region pro-
vides `-privacy for all points of the region, it may in some
situations produce points that are unlikely to be visited by the
user (e.g., inside a river or a sea). In this case, the output may
be remapped to the nearest possible point (e.g., the side of
the river or the sea). This remapping is a post-processing (of
the output of the mechanism) that is independent of the orig-
inal location of the user, and therefore preserves `-privacy as
shown by [11, Proposition 20].
A similar situation happens when the domainX is a discrete
set of points. In this situation, we can also use a symmetric
mechanism to provide `-privacy for a continuous region cov-
ering these points, and remap its outputs to the discrete ele-
ments of X. In this case two techniques of remapping can be
used.
1. The output is remapped to its nearest element of X.
2. Bayesian remapping can be applied in the same manner
as in differential privacy [17]. Using a prior distribution
pi of visiting the points of X and the mechanism K , a
posterior distribution over X is constructed after observ-
ing the output z. Afterwards z is remapped to the point
R(z) that minimizes the expected loss with respect to the
posterior distribution. More precisely
R(z) = argmin
z∗∈X
∑
x∈X
pi(x) P(K(x) = z)L(x, z∗).
The above two techniques of remapping both yield two non-
symmetric mechanisms satisfying `-privacy for the discrete
region X but they vary in terms of utility. To evaluate this as-
pect, we compare between the utilities of the two mechanisms
in the case of -geo-indistinguishability as follows.
We discretize the region of Los Angeles (described in Sec-
tion 7.2) into a fine grid of 80 × 60 cells in which the side
length of every cell is 0.5 km, and construct the priors of two
users using their check-ins in Gowalla dataset (they have 1120
and 753 check-ins in the region). Using the Laplace noise
function, we construct the above (remapped) mechanisms for
each user and evaluate their utilities for various values of .
Figure 5 demonstrates the results of this experiment, which
shows that the Bayesian remapping is significantly better than
the other technique. This superiority is clearly due to the fact
that Bayesian remapping is optimized to the user’s prior un-
like the other simple technique that is independent of it.
8 Conclusion
The main objective of our work was to optimize the utility
of the mechanisms accessing LBSs while satisfying a certain
level of location privacy for their users. More precisely, we
considered mechanisms that obfuscate the user’s location be-
fore querying the LBS such that certain privacy requirements
are satisfied while at the same time minimizing the degrada-
tion of the service utility due to this obfuscation.
We model the user’s location privacy generically by `-
privacy [11] in which the privacy requirements are precisely
described by the distinguishability function `(.). This notion
is an adaptation of differential privacy [8] that restricts the
distinguishability between every two databases differing in
the data of one participant, hence protecting the privacy of
participants in these databases. Based on the discrete char-
acteristic of the query results of databases, linear optimiza-
tion techniques have been used to construct “optimal” mech-
anisms to query them while satisfying differential privacy
[17, 20, 5, 9, 10]. However, we have shown that these tech-
niques are not practical to construct an optimal privacy mech-
anism that satisfies `-privacy on continuous regions. There-
fore, we chose to focus on “symmetric” mechanisms that sat-
isfy `-privacy for a user by adding to his location a noise vec-
tor that is sampled according to a noise distribution P on the
vector space E2. We described the conditions on P and its
corresponding noise function to achieve `-privacy on a given
geographical region X. In addition, when X has a non-zero
area and satisfies, together with the distinguishability function
`(.), a certain condition we proved by Theorem 6 that satisfy-
ing `-privacy on X is equivalent to satisfying it on the entire
space R2. This results implies that the optimal noise function
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Figure 4: The expected loss (in kilometers) due to satisfying -geo-indistinguishability for four users in Los Angeles. The
solid curve corresponds to the symmetric mechanism with Laplace noise and the dashed curve corresponds to non-symmetric
mechanisms personalized to every user.
for R2 is also optimal for every region satisfying the condition
stated in the above theorem, making it unnecessary to change
the noise function when the user moves to a different region.
Furthermore Theorem 7 strengthens this result and confines
the choice of such optimal noise function to the class of cir-
cular noise functions. Since optimal noise functions do not
always exist for given `(.) and X, we described a parametric
space ΩM,ρ of noise functions, and proved by Theorem 8 that
this space has always an optimal member regardless of ` and
X.
Finally as a special case of `-privacy, we considered -geo-
indistinguishability and derived for it an optimal noise func-
tion. More precisely we show by Theorem 9 that the planar
Laplace function is optimal for every region with a non-zero
area and every increasing loss function. Finally, we com-
pared between the utility of the symmetric mechanism that
uses this function to draw the added noise vectors, and the
non-symmetric one constructed using the linear optimization
techniques as in [4]. To achieve a reasonable level of expected
loss, the privacy level has to be relaxed, and in this case it
was seen that the discretization error of the non-symmetric
mechanism becomes significant compared to symmetric one,
making the latter more favored.
As future work, we plan to consider other instances of `-
privacy, e.g. (D, )-location privacy and more generally the
class of D-restricted distinguishability functions. We believe
that the framework that we have introduced provides the ba-
sic tools to identify the optimal noise functions for these in-
stances.
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